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Despite a broadening consensus that global health care efforts have an impact on national and 
global security, the U.S. national security community’s efforts to address global health are weak 
and uncoordinated. The 2006 National Security Strategy states that “development reinforces 
diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build 
stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.” While the U.S. government struggles to find the right 
balance among the “three Ds” of defense, diplomacy, and development, the U.S. military has 
increased its involvement in global health where it perceives the diplomacy and development to be 
underresourced—or to achieve its own specific objectives. As efforts to renew the capabilities of 
civilian agencies proceed, it is an appropriate time to step back and consider the role that the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) currently plays in global health, the impact of its health activities 
on national and regional security, and the role it could play to support a newly balanced U.S. 
foreign policy. 
The intersection of global health and national security is usually discussed in terms of “threats” 
and is best understood in the context of biosecurity, biosurveillance, and medical 
countermeasures. Less well understood are the importance of health development in fragile or 
conflict-affected states and the issue of health diplomacy in bilateral and multilateral relations. 
Recent reports have highlighted the potential relevance of chronic disease, water and sanitation, 
and access to basic health care on the stability, security, economic stability, and legitimacy of 
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governments.2 This paper attempts to frame health and security in terms of the “opportunities” 
they present to advance both the United States’ objectives and the quality of global health care. 
DoD plays a critical supporting role in the nation’s interagency response to human-made and 
natural disasters. It provides unparalleled logistical, air transport, and sea transport capabilities, as 
well as expeditionary medical personnel, to protect the health and welfare of populations affected 
by crises. In addition, DoD’s extensive network of laboratories, technologies, therapies, and 
medical expertise is a key component in the overall U.S. and international global health 
surveillance and response system. Myriad DoD programs have an impact on global health, but 
each has different and sometimes conflicting objectives. Some short-term DoD activities risk 
undermining the longer-term objectives of civilian development agencies. Although, relative to 
the huge overall DoD budget, the small amounts in DoD programs spent on global health make it 
difficult to garner the attention of senior DoD leaders, these expenditures represent large sums to 
developing nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which have pointed out that 
much can be accomplished in global health with small monetary outlays. 
In combat environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD has a clear responsibility to protect 
the health of its forces. But it has been thrust into an unanticipated role in the reconstruction of 
host-nation medical capability and infrastructure, given the relative lack of adequately resourced 
expeditionary capacity among civilian U.S. government agencies. The counterinsurgency strategy 
of “clear, hold, and build” requires a swift and agile entry of agencies that can build essential 
services, including health, water, and sanitation, within a very small window of opportunity. But 
civilian agencies are woefully underresourced, and aid mechanisms are complex, inflexible, and 
uncoordinated. If U.S. civilian agencies are not sufficiently mobilized, or if their NGO 
implementing partners are not willing to participate in such a “securitized” version of relief and 
development efforts, then the military will fill perceived gaps. New civilian structures have been 
created to plan and implement reconstruction and stabilization missions, without achieving a 
consensus on the strategies required for health-sector reconstruction to reduce the risk that 
conflicts will recur or ensuring that individual agencies play complementary roles. Civil-military 
dialogue on these issues is vital, and it must take into account the voice of civil society and the 
post-conflict nation itself. 
The most controversial areas of DoD’s involvement in global health are diplomacy and 
development. In both, DoD is best equipped to serve in a supporting role to NGOs and civilian 
government agencies. Progress on creating an appropriate, fiscally responsible role for DoD in 
these areas is hindered by the lack of a whole-of-government strategic approach and of productive 
debate on the effect that a more integrated civil-military process would have on the NGO 
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implementing partners of civilian agencies. To better define and prioritize the duties and goals of 
such involved agencies, including DoD, the U.S. government should take these steps: 
 Create a strategy for global health that balances the security dimension appropriately within a 
holistic national and international approach and clearly articulates the role of global public 
health within the U.S. national security strategy. 
 Create a global health security cooperation plan to guide DoD investments that build the 
capacity of partner militaries’ public health, medical, and veterinary systems in a way that 
complements the health development and health security efforts of civilian agencies and 
multilateral partners. 
 Ensure that DoD’s global health actions support security and stability by improving 
coordination between the undersecretary of defense for policy, the assistant secretary of 
defense for health affairs, geographic combatant commands, and their subordinate agencies 
and components. 
 Combine civilian and military disease surveillance and outbreak response capabilities, and 
create a synergy between these activities and the public health systems capacity-building 
efforts of U.S. government agencies. 
 Revise U.S. military training plans to support and complement building partner militaries’ 
public health and medical care capacities. 
 Create an integrated interagency assessment and evaluation system to measure both the health 
and the security outcomes and effects of the interventions noted above. 
These steps will require an expansion of resources of the State Department and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development and strong political leadership from these agencies, as well as more 
robust political will and support from Congress. But by taking these steps, the U.S. government 
will become better able to meet its global health, foreign policy, and national security objectives, 
without an expansion of the DoD’s budget or authorities. 
Overview 
Global health and U.S. national security are inexorably intertwined. “Global health” is 
increasingly understood as a strategic approach to health promotion and disease prevention that 
transcends national interests in an increasingly globalized, multilateral, and interdependent world. 
Framing the issue of health this broadly requires consideration of safe water, sanitation, and 
animal health, rather than medical care alone. The health of human and animal populations 
overseas can affect nearly every aspect of Americans’ safety and prosperity—from trade to the 
stability of foreign governments and populations, to the physical well-being of U.S. citizens at 
home. 
As shown by the cautionary example of how the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus 
reached Toronto by commercial airliner after the disease’s outbreak in China, protecting any 
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country’s citizens depends on detecting outbreaks early and then quickly isolating them at their 
origin. Therefore, developing strong national public health systems and global surveillance 
systems benefits both the United States and other nations. Yet global health-related programs and 
activities are not coordinated across the U.S. government nor within federal agencies or 
departments. Programs are usually directed at a specific disease, and often with resources that are 
not proportional to the disease’s prevalence or risk. 
The recognition of a link between global health care and security has grown dramatically in recent 
years. From World War II through the United States’ unilateral renouncement of its biological 
weapons in 1969, the only diseases of security concern were those that were, or had the potential 
to be, weaponized. That outlook changed in 2000 with the publication of The Global Infectious 
Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States,3 the first U.S. National Intelligence 
Estimate “to consider the national security dimension of a nontraditional threat,” which 
broadened the global health aperture beyond infectious diseases: 
Highly publicized virulent infectious diseases—including HIV/AIDS, a potential influenza 
pandemic, and “mystery” illnesses such as the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome—remain the most direct heath-related threats to the United States, but are not the 
only health indicators with strategic significance. Chronic, noncommunicable diseases; 
neglected topical diseases; maternal and child mortality; malnutrition; sanitation and access to 
clean water; and availability of basic health care also affect the U.S. national interest through 
their effects on the economies, governments, and militaries of key countries and regions.4 
At the same time, concern over bioterrorism increased dramatically during the 1990s and even 
further, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The potential threat posed by 
weaponized agents compounds the magnitude and range of health-related risks to national 
security, although some experts believe that the response to bioterrorism threats has been out of 
proportion to the actual threat. 
DoD has long made significant contributions to science through military medicine, but its 
strategic thinking about global health and security issues is evolving very slowly. Many defense 
analysts view U.S. and Western efforts to improve the lives of populations considered at risk for 
jihadist or other anti-American influences as particularly important. A prominent DoD report 
recently noted that “in the battle for the narrative [between jihadists and the West], the United 
States must not ignore its ability to bring its considerable soft power to bear in order to reinforce 
the positive aspects of joint force operations. Humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, securing 
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the safety of local populations, military-to-military exercises, health care, and disaster relief are 
just a few examples of the positive measures that we offer.”5 
However, there is little direct evidence to suggest that health-sector activities contribute to the 
long-term security, stability, governance, or legitimacy of fragile states.6 Furthermore, DoD’s 
involvement in these “soft power” activities is not without controversy. Though few would argue 
with DoD’s logistical support for the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance after natural 
disasters, civilian relief agencies have pointed out that because DoD’s assets are usually more 
expensive than their civilian equivalents, military assets should be used only as a last resort and 
also that to avoid militarizing disaster relief, these assets should remain under civilian control. 
More controversial, however, is DoD’s growing peacetime civil-military health activity—which 
DoD calls humanitarian assistance, but which more closely resembles what civilian agencies call 
development. Such activities include well drilling, constructing or repairing clinics, and hospital 
ship visits. DoD refers to these peacetime activities as “shaping” or “phase 0” activities because 
they prepare its personnel for their combat and postcombat roles, which follow as phases 1 to 6. 
Stewart Patrick laments, however, that “what DoD calls phase 0 is what we used to call foreign 
policy.” A clear benefit would be gained by more precisely defining which of these peacetime 
activities truly contribute to fulfilling the principles of security and stability, and by ensuring that 
these often short-term efforts set the stage for the long-term development and conflict-mitigation 
efforts of civilian agencies, rather than competing or interfering with long-range goals or 
threatening the impartiality of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that claim to abide by 
these principles. 
DoD has also come to terms with the importance of rebuilding civil society following direct 
combat operations. However unlikely U.S. involvement in new combat operations and post-
conflict operations may be, the fact remains that the United States is now involved in two major 
reconstructive efforts; likewise, the possibility of involvement in other wars, even decades into the 
future, cannot be completely eliminated. In 2005, the deputy secretary of defense issued a policy 
directing military planners to prepare for military support for stability, security, transition, and 
reconstruction operations with the same level of attention that they place on planning for combat 
operations. Under this policy, DoD medical personnel must be “prepared to meet military and 
civilian health requirements in stability operations.”7 
Within the constraints of its existing authorities, missions, and expertise, DoD should be viewed 
as a supporting agency in the pursuit of global health. DoD is at a strategic crossroads on global 
                                                          
 
5 U.S. Joint Force Command, The Joint Operating Environment, Center for Joint Futures, November 25, 
2008, 39–40. 
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health—it is driven to do more in post-conflict settings and in biomedical research and 
surveillance, indirectly involved in supporting health diplomacy and development, yet often 
poorly received by and integrated with underresourced and understaffed civilian agencies and 
poorly organized internally to rise to these demands. Its roles and responsibilities must be 
clarified, and its conflicting policies and strategies must be resolved. Fears of securitization must 
be critically examined in light of available evidence, not emotion, and DoD’s effects on a wide 
range of stakeholders must be addressed, if it is to fulfill its potential as an important supporting 
player in efforts to improve global health. 
The U.S. Government’s Global Health Activities 
A number of major U.S. government global health programs have an impact on national and 
global security. These programs are listed in appendix A, which is intended to complement an 
inventory of Global Health Funding being conducted by the National Security Council. Under 
these U.S. programs, efforts to address potential health threats to U.S. security and leverage 
opportunities fall into three basic categories. First, extensive U.S. government biodefense and 
bioterrorism preparedness activities aim to prevent the spread of infectious diseases or biological 
threats to Americans at home or U.S. service members overseas. These efforts are led by the 
Department of State, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), and DoD. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) under HHS and the 
Department of Agriculture lead U.S. government efforts to develop medical countermeasures to 
the potential exposure of U.S. citizens and livestock to disease. Second, the State Department, 
HHS, and other agencies engage in health diplomacy to improve bilateral and multilateral 
relationships in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Third, the United States undertakes 
programs to reduce poverty and improve the health of foreign populations in developing nations, 
including those susceptible to radical, anti-Western influence. Support for governance and 
economic development is in part intended to reduce the risk of political instability, mitigate the 
effects of infectious diseases, avert conflict, and help post-conflict countries rebuild. The U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), 
and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, among others, provide funding for these 
purposes. 
Diplomatic and Development Efforts 
In the last 10 years, issues such as the handling of the SARS outbreak in China, the USNS Mercy 
hospital ship’s visits to Southeast Asia after the tsunami, and the donation of a mobile Army 
surgical hospital to Pakistan after the Kashmiri earthquake have renewed debate on the 
relationship between health and foreign affairs. David Fidler eloquently explains the various 
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models for conceptualizing this relationship.8 For purposes of this paper, “health diplomacy” is 
used to mean the influence of health activities on bilateral and multilateral relationships, and the 
influence of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy on the U.S. global health agenda. 
The major health diplomacy programs of the State Department are within the Office of 
International Health Affairs and Biodefense in the Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs. The office “protects U.S. security and global economic 
growth by promoting global health . . . and works with agencies throughout the U.S. government 
to facilitate policy-making regarding environmental health, infectious diseases, health in post-
conflict situations and surveillance and response, bioterrorism and health security.”9 The Avian 
Influenza Action Group is housed within this office. 
Additionally, two State Department offices with global health responsibilities report directly to the 
secretary of state. The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator is the interagency leadership 
and coordination body for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which is designed to 
reduce the transmission and impact of HIV/AIDS through support for prevention, treatment, and 
care programs. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization leads, 
coordinates, and institutionalizes the U.S. government’s civilian capacity to help stabilize and 
reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, including the creation or restoration 
of public health capabilities. 
USAID is the U.S. government’s focal point for development assistance. Its key goals include 
promoting human health and providing emergency humanitarian assistance.10 Its foreign service 
officers work closely with NGOs, international organizations, and other partners around the 
world. Since 2004, the MCC has also provided overseas development assistance. The MCC’s 
mission is to reduce global poverty by promoting sustainable economic growth. It has several 
programs aimed at improving the health of foreign populations and uses health indicators as a 
means of measuring progress. 
                                                          
 
8 Nations and organizations have undertaken health activities for the purpose of influencing both bilateral 
and multilateral relations, where achievement of any health objectives is secondary. Thus, Cuba deploys 
medical doctors abroad, and Hamas and Hezbollah operate medical clinics and engage in post-conflict 
health reconstruction. Likewise, however, diplomacy can influence health, such as when the World Health 
Organization negotiated the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Still others frame health 
diplomacy in terms of human rights, social justice, and equity. See D. P. Fidler, “Health as Foreign Policy: 
Between Principle and Power,” Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations (Summer/Fall 
2005): 179–194. 
9 See International Health and Biodefense, http://www.state.gov/g/oes/c1874.htm.  
10 See, for example, USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It, 
http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/primer.html.  
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Numerous other U.S. government entities administer diplomacy and development programs 
related to global health. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),11 the DHS Office 
of Health Affairs, and the Fogarty International Center of the NIH have significant activities 
related to global health development and diplomacy.12 
Biodefense and Global Biosurveillance Capacity Building 
Although biodefense has historically been DoD’s responsibility, this responsibility is now widely 
shared with the DHS and the NIH. The HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 
and Response (ASPR) is also a major contributor to biodefense preparedness and coordinates all 
international activities related to public health emergency preparedness and response. The ASPR’s 
responsibilities overlap with both the DHS Office of Health Affairs and the State Department’s 
reconstruction and stabilization initiatives. Also at HHS, but housed within the CDC, the 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response handles domestic 
preparedness activities, including management of the Select Agent Program and the Strategic 
National Stockpile. 
Global disease surveillance has historically been done by the World Health Organization (WHO), 
with member states contributing information according to their obligations under the 
International Health Regulations. This situation has been changing over the past decade as 
alternative sources of reporting and new programs to develop disease surveillance capacity have 
emerged.13 
Building the public health capacities of the United States and its multilateral partners improves 
biosurveillance and response, and protects populations at home and abroad. Internationally, the 
CDC’s Coordinating Office for Global Health builds transparent, sustained public health systems 
overseas, in part to be able to rapidly detect and respond to emerging infectious diseases and 
bioterrorist threats. Three main programs are coordinated in the CDC’s Global Disease Detection 
Program: the Field Epidemiology Training Program, the International Emerging Infections 
Program, and influenza activities related to surveillance and detection.14 
Biodefense and biosurveillance expertise is diffused across agencies, with inadequate information 
exchanged between the “stovepiped” efforts directed at individual diseases. The result is a highly 
fragmented mosaic of capabilities, with occasional synergy but much overlap. Thus, along with 
DoD, DHS, HHS, the NIH, WHO, and the CDC, other departments and agencies with biodefense 
responsibilities include the Department of Commerce, the Food and Drug Administration, the 
Department of Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
                                                          
 
11 CDC Budget Request Summary, “Making Leaps in Public Health,” 2009. 
12 See http://www.fic.nih.gov/about/index.htm#mission. 
13 Mark Zacher, “The Transformation in Global Health Collaboration since the 1990s,” in Governing Global 
Health: Challenge, Response, Innovation, ed. Andrew F. Cooper et al. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007). 
14 This information was downloaded from http://www.cdc.gov/cogh/pdf/GDD_At_a_Glance_2008.pdf. 
eugene v. bonventre, kathleen h. hicks, and stacy m. okutani | 9   
A clear national security priority related to global health is the development of medical 
countermeasures. Outbreaks of exotic agents occur in other countries where the collection of 
samples and, when available, the testing of medical therapies is possible. Some of the microbes on 
the Select Agent Program’s list remain endemic in some parts of the world. Experimental vaccines 
and therapies have sometimes undergone field trials in those countries.15 Cooperation among 
countries enhances disease detection and fosters the development of effective medical 
countermeasures. 
The Department of Defense’s Global Health 
Activities 
A number of major DoD programs have an impact on global health.16 These programs are listed in 
appendix B, which is intended to complement an inventory of the U.S. government’s Global 
Health Funding being conducted by the National Security Council. The Defense Health Program 
(DHP) is designed to recruit and maintain healthy armed forces, and to protect the health of the 
nation’s 2.5 million soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, as well as 6.9 million family members 
and retirees. The DHP budget for fiscal year 2009 is $46 billion. Because disease has historically 
been significantly more lethal to military forces than combat itself, DoD addresses civilian health 
and endemic disease in areas where troops are deployed. As a World War II field manual notes, 
“Safeguarding and improving the health of the civilian population in an occupied area is 
necessary, not only for humanitarian reasons, but to protect the health of the occupying troops.”17 
Despite the very broad policy in DoD Directive 3000.05,18 there is no consistent strategy or policy 
for how the military should approach issues beyond force health protection. Yet a growing 
number of DoD activities affect health diplomacy and health development, accounting for more 
than $1.5 billion annually. The result is an ad hoc array of activities—from high-quality, 
innovative civil-military health activities to occasional projects that duplicate or undermine the 
efforts of other stakeholders—with a wide range in between. 
The DoD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program provides military-to-military assistance to educate 
foreign militaries about HIV/AIDS prevention methods, train foreign militaries as peer educators, 
                                                          
 
15 See Stacy Okutani, “Structuring Biodefense : Legacies and Current Policy Choices,” PhD dissertation, 
University of Maryland, 2007. 
16 Cristen Oehrig provided substantial research assistance for this section. 
17 U.S. Army and U.S. Navy, United States Army and Navy Field Manual of Civil Affairs Military 
Government, FM 27-5: 14, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/FM-27-5-1947.pdf.  
18 Paragraph 5.3.7 of this directive instructs the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness to 
“ensure DoD medical personnel and capabilities are prepared to meet military and civilian health 
requirements in stability operations.” 
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and develop country-specific education and testing centers. Its annual expenditures have grown to 
more than $100 million.19 
Support for Health Development and Diplomacy 
The only defense appropriation specifically intended to benefit civilian populations is the 
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Program.20 The intent of OHDACA 
is to provide opportunities for the U.S. military to strengthen relationships, promote peace and 
stability, and deter potential aggressors.21 A recent Harvard University review demonstrated that 
up to 68 percent of OHDACA’s projects have an impact on global health in a broad sense—
through public health and medical infrastructure; direct health care provision and training; and 
water, sanitation, and disaster preparedness, including building avian and pandemic influenza 
response capacity.22 Approximately $100 million was obligated in fiscal year 2008, but after major 
disasters, Congress added funds through supplemental budget requests so that total annual 
expenditures could exceed $200 million.23 
DoD’s medical, dental, and veterinary civic action programs and its medical readiness training 
exercises aim primarily to train U.S. troops to provide clinical care in developing countries.24 The 
Navy uses its medical ships the Mercy and the Comfort, as well as amphibious assault ships, for 
training missions that also provide medical care to indigenous populations abroad. Most missions 
include engineers who build or renovate health, water, and sanitation infrastructures. Mercy 
personnel (composed of staff from DoD, the Public Health Service, and NGOs) have seen 260,000 
patients in Southeast Asia since 2005, and the Comfort provided medical and dental care to 
98,000 civilians in Central and South America in 2007. Each mission lasts several weeks and costs 
$10 million to $20 million, excluding personnel costs. The Navy reports a significant impact on 
goodwill for the United States as a secondary benefit.25  
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) helps meet humanitarian needs as part 
of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2 to 7 percent of CERP funds are spent on 
                                                          
 
19 N.M. Serafino, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and 
Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 9, 2008, 48. 
20 The OHDACA has three components: a humanitarian mine action program, a humanitarian assistance 
program; and foreign disaster relief assistance. See www.dsca.osd.mil. 
21 OHDACA, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Budget Estimates Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid.”  
22 M. Bourdeaux et al., “The Department of Defense’s Involvement in Civic Assistance, Part I: The 
OHDACA Program,” Disaster Medicine & Public Health Preparedness, in press. 
23 See http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm, accessed at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/budget_justification/index.html. 
24 The use of DoD component operations and maintenance funds for these activities is authorized under 
Title 10, USC 401. 
25 See http://www.mercy.navy.mil/, http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/usnscomfort/Pages/default.aspx; and Dr. 
Ward Casscells, presentation at CSIS, January 7, 2009. 
eugene v. bonventre, kathleen h. hicks, and stacy m. okutani | 11   
public health projects, and in fiscal year 2007, CERP funds totaled $456 million. Since 2003, DoD 
has spent $523 million in health-sector reconstruction activities in Iraq on more than 1,800 
projects, including 378 primary health care centers and 138 hospital projects.26 
A less-well-known DoD effort is the U.S. Air Force’s International Health Specialist (IHS) 
Program. The Air Force selects skilled medics for IHS who also have cultural and linguistic 
competency, expertise in regional medical threats, knowledge of joint coordination, and the 
ability to build the “medical bridges” needed to support operations abroad.27 In recent years, DoD 
has begun exploring the expansion of IHS to the Army and Navy.28 
The Defense Institute for Medical Operations teaches train-the-trainer courses to military and 
civilian constituencies overseas, to improve partner-nation skills in disaster management, force 
health protection, and disease surveillance and outbreak management. Courses are funded 
primarily through the International Military Education and Training Program or through 
OHDACA.29 
In 2008, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD/HA) established 
an International Health Office. Though still a work in progress, ASD/HA provides the assistant 
secretary with subject matter expertise for developing policies related to DoD’s global public 
health activities, fulfilling its mandate under Directive 3000.05.30 The portion of the $46 billion 
defense health budget that is spent on international programs is not known. Because ASD/HA 
does not have oversight of any program mentioned above or direct responsibility for developing 
DoD’s strategy and guidance on long-term overseas activities, it has only a limited ability to 
coordinate DoD’s many diplomacy and development activities.31 
Although the funds committed to these programs are small by DoD’s overall standards, the 
programs still do directly affect the development activities of civilian agencies and NGOs, which 
often complain about poorly implemented programs that undermine their long-term efforts or 
distract host nations’ attention from more sustainable activities. Moreover, the techniques that 
                                                          
 
26 Casscells, presentation at CSIS, quoting the inspector general for Iraq’s quarterly report to Congress on 
October 30, 2008. 
27 Bo Joyner, “Helping Hands: International Health Specialist Program Opens Doors for Medical 
Professionals to Better Serve Around the World,” Citizen Airman, April 2004. 
28 There are no medical personnel organic to the Marine Corps, which relies upon the Navy for medical 
support. 
29 See http://airforcemedicine.afms.mil/idc/groups/public/documents/webcontent/ 
knowledgejunction.hcst?functionalarea=DIMO&doctype=subpage&docname=CTB_075080. 
30 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, November 28, 2005, 6. 
31 ASD/HA acknowledges DoD’s direct role in health diplomacy as “Conducting Diplomacy Through 
Health: How Our Military Health System Is an Indispensable Global Asset That Serves Our National 
Security Interests and Saves Lives,” http://www.tricare.mil/stakeholders/introduction.cfm. 
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DoD uses to execute small programs like OHDACA often become the model for larger military 
operations, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Support for Biodefense and Global Biosurveillance Capacity Building 
DoD’s medical research activities represent a significant portion of the U.S. national security 
response to potential global health threats, accounting for $900 million in fiscal year 2009.32 
Though these DoD activities are driven by force protection considerations, their benefits for 
global health are nonetheless significant. The Army, Navy, and Air Force each has capabilities that 
support biodefense research and surveillance, as do the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). 
The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, the lead medical research 
laboratory for the U.S. Biological Defense Research Program, is equipped to study highly 
hazardous infectious agents requiring maximum containment at biosafety level 4. The Army also 
operates the joint U.S.-Thai Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences in Bangkok, 
which conducts collaborative research on tropical diseases endemic to Thailand and Southeast 
Asia. 
The U.S. Navy operates medical research units in Egypt and Indonesia and a Medical Research 
Center in Peru to support military personnel deployed in these theaters. These facilities provide 
significant biocontainment space and field research in the infectious diseases indigenous to their 
host regions. The Naval Health Research Center in San Diego serves as the backbone for Naval 
biomedical research. 
The U.S. Air Force is the executive agent for DoD’s Global Laboratory-Based Worldwide 
Influenza Surveillance Program, located at the Air Force Institute for Operational Health in Texas, 
whose mission is to “promote global health and protect Air Force warriors and communities.”33 
Using sentinel bases in the United States, Europe, and Asia, the Air Force collects specimens from 
U.S. military personnel and their families for culturing and provides selected isolates to the CDC 
and WHO for further subtyping. 
Intersecting many of these programs and institutions is the DoD’s Global Emerging Infections 
Surveillance and Response System (GEIS). President Bill Clinton directed the establishment of 
GEIS in 1996 to “strengthen the prevention of, surveillance of, and response to infectious diseases 
that (1) are a threat to military personnel and families, (2) reduce medical readiness, or (3) 
present a risk to U.S. national security.”34 GEIS relies upon the various research and treatment 
facilities operated by DoD’s components both overseas and in the United States to provide early 
                                                          
 
32 See http://www.health.mil/MHSBlog/Article.aspx?ID=377. 
33 Brooks-City Base, “Air Force Institute for Operational Health,” http://www.brooks.af.mil/unjits/ 
airforceinstituteforoperationalhealth/index.asp. 
34 See www.geis.fhp.osd.mil. 
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detection of emerging threats and seeks to coordinate training, research, and response related to 
infectious diseases. 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, originally created to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons and expertise from the then–Soviet Union, is increasingly engaged in biodefense 
efforts. CTR is unique among DoD’s biosurveillance programs in that its primary objective is 
building the capacity of foreign scientists and governments, not the direct protection of U.S. 
service members. The program seeks to engage scientists in animal and human disease 
surveillance, and it assists foreign nations in building research facilities to be owned and operated 
by the host country. CTR funds may only be used for efforts to detect and respond to especially 
dangerous pathogens. 
The National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI)—formerly the Armed Forces Medical 
Intelligence Center—is charged with monitoring and analyzing events that could have a negative 
impact on the health of U.S. military and civilian populations, such as pandemic influenza, novel 
zoonotic diseases, and incidents of bioterrorism. the NCMI’s expansion into the homeland 
security area has been called a “critical link between DoD force protection and broader homeland 
health protection.”35 
The DTRA leads a recently created Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative dedicated to 
anticipating future genetically modified emerging threats and developing strategies and 
treatments that will enable a broad spectrum of medical countermeasures to be effectively 
undertaken. Almost 75 percent of the initial funding for this program—estimated to reach $1.5 
billion in its first five years—was provided to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.36 
Recommendations 
 Recommendation 1: Create a strategy for global health that balances the security dimension 
appropriately within a holistic national and international approach and clearly articulates the 
role of global public health within the U.S. national security strategy. 
The growing tendency to view global health as a national security issue invites scrutiny. Some have 
termed this trend the “securitization of public health”: 
Securitization means that the theory and practice of public health are increasingly considered 
in security terms. Linking public health to different concepts of security became ubiquitous in 
the past decade, whether discourse focused on homeland, national, collective, global, or 
human security. These linkages revealed a widespread belief that securitizing public health was 
a productive strategy to achieve greater protection from pathogenic threats. A critical aspect of 
                                                          
 
35 See www.upmc.biosecurity.org/website/biosecurity_briefing/archive/govt_response. 
36 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Federal Funding for Biological Weapons Prevention 
and Defense, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009,” April 2008, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/media/ 
fy2009_bw)budget.pdf. 
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the securitization process involved elevating public health as a political priority in domestic 
governance, foreign policy, and international diplomacy. The securitization phenomenon 
represents one of the most important policy shifts creating the new governance challenge of 
biosecurity.37 
Such “securitization” could help the global health community. Despite a growing chorus of 
support for rebuilding the capacity of both the State Department and USAID, these agencies are 
not likely to ever enjoy the same degree of support from Congress as does DoD, and the defense 
budget will always greatly exceed those of these other two agencies. For instance, U.S. defense 
spending in Afghanistan is 20 times larger than development spending.38 The “national security” 
label thus provides the promise of increased funding and attention, greater funding flexibility, and 
adding DoD’s planning, logistics, and medical prowess (both latent and actualized) to global 
health initiatives. 
There are also risks to characterizing investments in global health as security investments and 
having health programs carried out by entities perceived to be agents of a security organization.39 
International and nongovernmental humanitarian responders are able to intervene during and 
after conflicts and in otherwise closed societies because they are perceived as independent and 
impartial. When they lose this hard-earned reputation, they can become victims of attacks or lose 
the support of communities in implementing activities such as vaccination or awareness-raising 
campaigns. 
Securitization in biosurveillance has likewise had mixed results. A security-centric approach has 
brought substantial funding to biodefense. But in some countries, it has resulted in the 
development of sophisticated laboratory facilities that allow researchers to work with exotic and 
highly pathogenic agents that are not necessarily endemic in, or very pertinent to, the domestic 
context. This kind of investment builds physical capacity but with questionable benefits for the 
local population—and at the risk of diverting resources from greater needs and increasing the 
likelihood of an accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens. Instead, building the 
capacity of basic public health systems, surveillance systems, and local research might pay greater 
security dividends by facilitating the earlier detection of outbreaks and emerging diseases, as well 
as a more robust local response. 
In this respect, the CDC’s programs and the Fogarty Center grants serve to build public health 
systems and infrastructure in a few nations and are focused on creating both local expertise in 
endemic diseases and institutional norms of scientific cooperation. These programs do not 
                                                          
 
37 David P. Fidler and Lawrence O. Gostin, Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological Weapons, Public Health, 
and the Rule of Law (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
38 Oxfam America, “Smart Development in Practice: Field Report from Afghanistan,” 2009.  
39 See Andrew Lakoff and Stephen J. Collier, eds., Global Health and Security in Question (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008); and Rebecca Katz and Daniel Singer, “Health and Security in Foreign 
Policy,” WHO Bulletin 85, no. 3 (March 2007). 
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directly serve biodefense or bioterrorist defense efforts—nor are they designed with that purpose 
in mind. Rather, such efforts build mutually beneficial networks of trust and scientific expertise 
that serve global health care efforts. Increased information exchanges between these programs and 
DoD, however, may result in a more synergistic effect on biosecurity. 
The lack of a unified U.S. national approach exacerbates the debate over how to best link national 
security and global health. The expertise, capability, and responsibility for global health reside in a 
number of separate government departments and programs, with evident duplicated efforts, 
absences of coordination, and gaps in approaches. Unless there begins to be stronger unifying 
direction, the inherent ability of security institutions and programs to garner resources for global 
health, combined with the logically helpful recognition by DoD and other agencies of the security 
implications of global health, will continue to drive unbalanced, poorly integrated U.S. activities. 
Thus, the United States’ global health strategy and its security subcomponent should expand 
beyond the “threat” framework and take into account the myriad opportunities available for 
improved coordination with multilateral partners, a more coherent use of health diplomacy, and 
better transitions from short-term crisis responses to long-term global health development. 
Improved visibility and coordination among programs across the U.S. government will create 
greater synergy for increasing the capacity of partner nations’ public health systems. Within DoD, 
this shift away from direct clinical intervention and toward support for whole-government 
capacity building is consistent with the agency’s agenda for building partnership capacity outlined 
in the Quadrennial Defense Review.40 
Adjusting priorities from within agencies is challenging because staff are naturally protective of 
their own specific programs and strive to preserve the resources associated with those programs. 
To mitigate the risk of programmatic baggage unduly influencing the creation of a global health 
strategy, the National Security Council is likely to be the most appropriate convening authority to 
drive this process. The development of this strategy requires a cross-pollination of expertise from 
both the security and health sectors and must include all stakeholder agencies—including, along 
with all those discussed above, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug 
Administration, the Commerce Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Broad 
interagency participation will leverage activities that address the security implications of 
environmental health and climate change. 
 Recommendation 2: Create a global health security cooperation plan to guide DoD’s 
investments in partner nations that build the capacity of their militaries’ public health, 
medical, and veterinary systems to complement the health development and health security 
efforts of civilian agencies and multilateral and implementing partners. The U.S. Africa 
Command and U.S. Southern Command are particularly well suited to pilot such 
coordinated, long-term global health and security strategies in their regions. 
                                                          
 
40 See http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/. 
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 Recommendation 3: Ensure that DoD’s global health actions support security and stability by 
improving coordination between the undersecretary of defense for policy, the assistant 
secretary of defense for health affairs, geographic combatant commands, and their 
subordinate agencies and associated components. 
Ultimately, healthy U.S. military and security forces will be more capable of providing security 
and stability than militaries that are weakened by infectious or chronic diseases.41 DoD will likely 
contribute to any U.S. global health strategy. Just as at the national level, however, its programs 
are not well coordinated and have global health benefits that are largely secondary because the 
programs were created for other purposes. DoD’s sheer diversity and size, coupled with the variety 
of authorities and accounts through which it undertakes global health-related initiatives, create an 
integration challenge. 
Moreover, the authorities for most international programs rest with the undersecretary of defense 
for policy, whereas the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs oversees health personnel 
and readiness issues. The creation of a policy in Washington would not necessarily change 
activities conducted by the armed services or the combatant commands on the ground—unless 
there is buy-in from those levels through existing guidance mechanisms, and a clear 
demonstration of the advantages of moving in this new direction. The potential for synergy that 
would result from greater synchronization of existing programs within DoD, and improved 
coordination with long-term efforts of civilian agencies as outlined in a broad U.S. global health 
strategy, would likely have a large impact without increasing DoD’s programmatic budgets. 
The undersecretary of defense for policy publishes an annual classified document, the Guidance 
for Employment of the Force, outlining DoD’s strategy of security cooperation and contingency 
response. The same office, in coordination with the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs 
and the DTRA, should issue guidance on a global health security cooperation plan to guide DoD’s 
investments and activities that have an impact on international health diplomacy and 
development, overseas biodefense, and overseas medical countermeasures activities. This would 
require consultation across U.S. government agencies, which would mean distributing an 
unclassified version of this plan. Civilian agencies must be willing and able to contribute to 
shaping this document; it would require robust State Department leadership for health diplomacy 
coordination and USAID leadership for health development. Global health and security must be 
an integral part of rebalancing the three Ds—defense, diplomacy, and development. 
The health security cooperation plan should emphasize military-to-military cooperation, focused 
on improving the health of partner nations’ security forces, building partners’ capacity for disaster 
                                                          
 
41 In “DoD Inspector General Report No. SPO-2008-001 from July 2008,” the special inspector general for 
Iraq reconstruction noted that “building a responsive, proactive, and successful health care delivery system 
in a stability operation scenario such as Iraq will expedite and sustain the ability of the Iraqi Army to be 
fully combat ready and more effective in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.” 
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and disease outbreak management and response in support of civilian authorities, and protecting 
the health infrastructure and functions during conflicts and peacekeeping operations. 
The growing interagency nature of the U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command, 
coupled with the risk of natural disasters in both regions and the myriad health needs on the 
African continent, make those two commands particularly suitable for the creation of regional 
health security cooperation plans with significant input from civilian agencies. 
Because of the many programs and multiple levels of oversight and execution within DoD, this 
plan must have ownership at all levels, from the secretary of defense to the Joint Staff and the 
combatant commands, to the services and joint task forces and units in the field. Military medical 
personnel alone cannot achieve this plan synchronization without strong command ownership 
and leadership, as well as adequate civil-military coordination at all levels. Formalizing this plan 
would improve coordination between the policy and the health experts in the secretary of 
defense’s office and would give both sets of experts a single voice on the health and security 
activities of the combatant commands, their components, and the services. 
In critical countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and key African nations, DoD should 
consider “adopt-a-hospital” programs that pair local military hospitals with similar-sized U.S. 
military hospitals. Faculty and staff exchanges could build local military health capacity, especially 
in critical gap areas—nursing, biomedical equipment repair, laboratory and radiology technicians, 
and the like. Having personnel on the ground could leverage existing programmatic money from 
Afghanistan/Iraq Security Forces Funds to focus military-to-military assistance. U.S. military 
teaching hospitals and the Uniformed Services University could exchange visiting professors with 
their foreign equivalents and assist with curriculum development. In areas where U.S. military 
operations are ongoing, the complex web of U.S. and international donor aid and development 
mechanisms for global health must be untangled, and their caveats resolved, to allow a better 
balance among the three Ds. In the meantime, the United States should seek increased health 
diplomacy and health development contributions from its coalition partners, rather than 
emphasizing troop contributions.42 
 Recommendation 4: Combine civilian and military disease surveillance and outbreak response 
capabilities, and create a synergy between these activities and U.S. government agencies’ 
capacity-building efforts for public health systems. 
DoD’s surveillance sites share information and expertise fairly easily among their domestic and 
overseas laboratories, the CDC, and international networks such as WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert 
and Response Network. The CDC and WHO will always be underfunded relative to DoD, so a 
more formal relationship among U.S. government surveillance and response capabilities may 
achieve greater synergy than maintaining independent systems. 
                                                          
 
42 Norway is an interesting model; it contributes 1 percent of its gross national income as official 
development assistance, and its civilian and military contributions to Afghanistan operations are equal. 
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GEIS, regional laboratories, the CTR Program, and other DoD programs that emphasize disease 
surveillance or focus on particularly dangerous pathogens should coordinate more closely with 
each other and with the CDC and USAID to determine to what extent developing general public 
health infrastructure and systems capacity would achieve these same goals, while also being useful 
to the broader U.S. global health engagement strategies now being developed. This may require 
legislative changes in some of the authorities in both civilian and military agencies, and a change 
in mindset from focusing on “threats” to “opportunities.” Strengthening overseas public health 
infrastructures and systems would not only improve the detection of outbreaks but could also 
reduce the likelihood of new outbreaks as public health, water, and sanitation conditions 
improve—better protecting both the American and partner nations’ populations. Moreover, 
expanding agencies’ authority to address systemic issues, beyond just dangerous pathogens, would 
strengthen preparation for emerging and unanticipated diseases, address unglamorous but more 
common diarrheal and respiratory diseases, and at the same time maintain emphasis on 
protection against dangerous pathogens. An increased emphasis on building local veterinary 
capacity would reduce the risk of zoonotic origin for new diseases. 
 Recommendation 5: Revise U.S. military training plans to support and complement efforts to 
build partner militaries’ public health and medical care capacities. 
Military health personnel must train to hone their clinical skills for use on the battlefield, and 
their deployment skills for work in remote areas. Such training missions often deliver health care 
to civilian populations, from a variety of platforms, including hospital ships, warships, C-130s, 
and even the tailgate of a pickup truck. Military medics conduct medical civic action programs, 
known as MEDCAPS, while deployed, either as part of a strategic plan as in the Horn of Africa or 
because commanders are loath to see their medical personnel idle under deployed conditions. 
However, such training has potential health diplomacy benefits—and risks. Hospital ships’ visits 
to Central and South America have paid dividends not only for the skills of military medics but 
also in influencing both populations and government leaders to view the United States and its 
military in a more favorable light. The Mercy’s visit to Indonesia was more problematic, because 
the standard of care delivered far exceeded what the Indonesian government was able to provide 
after the ship departed, and Indonesia claimed that this had undermined its legitimacy and 
authority. 
Such training missions should be more closely coordinated with military and civilian authorities 
in partner nations, and should support and complement the State Department’s health diplomacy 
plans and USAID’s health development plans. Activities that focus on supporting the efforts of 
U.S. government civilian agencies to improve public health infrastructure and systems capacities 
more closely match DoD’s expected role during stability operations than training to provide 
direct patient care to civilians. Capacity building more closely fits into the evolving whole-
government strategy for providing global health care. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
demonstrated that military medical care involves reconstruction and capacity-building tasks far 
more often than direct patient care, so refocusing military training activities ensures that military 
medics “train as they will fight.” Short-term military training activities should not be isolated 
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events. Instead, they should be part of a spectrum of activities, in conjunction with civilian and 
multilateral partners and stakeholders, that take a more long-term view of the ultimate goal of 
development through poverty reduction. 
As the U.S. Africa Command seeks to improve its relations on that continent, it faces an ocean of 
needs. It should focus its training missions on true two-way information exchanges with African 
military medical personnel, with an eye toward improving military public health infrastructure 
and health systems capacities, in coordination with civilian agencies’ plans. This would fulfill 
DoD’s training requirements while reducing the risk of short-term, unconnected clinical activities 
that are not locally sustainable. Military veterinarians are essential to this effort, given the 
importance of animal health to social and economic well-being in most African countries. 
Training missions that involve vaccinating local herds are beneficial. But it would be even more 
worthwhile to strengthen local veterinarians’ capability to address animal health in a sustainable 
manner, in support of civilian agencies, donors, and NGOs with similar objectives and a more 
long-term point of view. 
Civilian agencies seldom find support or funding for such a “systems” approach, because it is 
easier to explain a single disease like HIV or malaria than a complex system; the American public 
will donate funds to specific diseases, but the resulting disease-specific stovepipes leave gaps and 
often compete with one another. Military training resources are always available; they do not need 
donor support, so they can focus on the unglamorous “systems” side—but only if civilian public 
health experts lend their expertise to steer such military activities in the right direction and ensure 
that training efforts support long-term civilian development goals. 
 Recommendation 6: Create an integrated interagency assessment and evaluation system to 
measure both the health and security outcomes of the interventions described above. 
Because these recommendations chart a new way forward at the nexus of global health and 
national security, the effectiveness of this method should be measured—ideally, by an objective 
mechanism outside the military. Capitalizing on the experience of the State Department and 
USAID, techniques should be developed that attempt to measure the outcome of programmatic 
interventions, and the impact of activities on both global health and on security objectives.43 
Critical analysis of data by scholars should be fed back into the planning systems of each agency to 
allow decisionmakers to emphasize cost-effective activities that have the greatest chance for long-
term sustainable impact and capacity growth. DoD has a long history of measuring the 
effectiveness of its destructive activities—it risks pilots’ lives to photograph the results of aerial 
bombardments, for instance. Military medical personnel, like their civilian counterparts, strive to 
practice “evidence-based medicine” to ensure the efficacy of their medical interventions. The U.S. 
government should accept no less when it comes to global health interventions. If agencies 
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implement health programs for the purpose of improving security or stability, they should collect 
data prospectively to test whether these activities have the intended effect. 
Increased coordination requires improved information sharing. And this information sharing will 
be easier if military and civilian personnel agree on a common terminology and on common 
assessments, both for peacetime activities and for responses to crises; collect data in common 
formats; and develop common monitoring and evaluation techniques. Military databases on 
global health should be unclassified to the maximum extent possible. Databases such as the 
Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (www.ohasis.org) should be 
opened to USAID for programmatic coordination, and to academia and contractors for 
assessments and analysis. Crisis response data should be shared with civilian databases, such as the 
Complex Emergency Database and the Emergency Events Database.44 DoD’s disaster response in 
support of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance should also share information with the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and with WHO as the cluster lead for 
health-sector crisis response. 
Conclusion 
Although U.S. government efforts to advance global health have evolved from divergent interests, 
including humanitarian motives, today there is an increasing willingness to link global health with 
U.S. national security. However, viewing the complex linkages between global health and national 
security in terms of opportunities rather than threats will better enable the U.S. government to 
improve its coordination with its international partners and other stakeholders, and to achieve a 
better balance between security and global health. Shifting DoD’s resources more in favor of 
building the public health capacity of partner nations’ militaries, and synchronizing its efforts 
with the Department of State’s health diplomacy and USAID’s health development efforts, would 
create a synergy beneficial to global health, and potentially beneficial to global and national 
security. 
Today, more sustained investments in capacity building are being seen as necessary to achieve 
lasting improvements in global health and, hence, in economic growth, stability, and security.45 If 
the World Bank and WHO are correct in their conclusions that virulent diseases can destabilize 
economies and entire political systems,46 then it is in the national security interest of the United 
States to address the causes of diseases and develop effective systems to detect and contain them. 
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45 See Ron Waldman, Health Programming in Post-Conflict Fragile States (Arlington, Va.: Basic Support for 
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Accordingly, the global health activities of those U.S. agencies whose activities are related to 
national security must be better coordinated to improve the U.S. government’s overall 
effectiveness in this area. Moreover, the White House, the National Security Council, and 
Congress should appropriately harness and rebalance DoD’s vast resources and growing interest 
in health care to ensure that the military’s activities and investments advance, rather than hinder, 
the nation’s global health agenda. 
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Appendix A. U.S. Government Global Health 
Programs That Have an Impact on National 
Security 
 
Program Parent Organization Mission 
Bureau of Global 
Health 
U.S. Agency for 
International 
Development (USAID) 
Confront global health challenges by 
improving the quality, availability, and use of 
essential health services  
Office of U.S. Foreign 
Disaster Assistance 
USAID Save lives, alleviate human suffering, and 
reduce the social and economic impact of 
natural and man-made disasters worldwide. 
Includes Food for Peace, Displaced Children 
and Orphan’s Fund, Patrick J. Leahy War 
Victims Fund, Victims of Torture Fund 
Office of International 
Health and Biodefense 
State Department 
Bureau of Oceans and 
Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs 
Protect U.S. security and global economic 
growth by promoting global health 
Avian Influenza Action 
Group 




Coordinates U.S. international engagement 
with multilateral partners and the private 
sector to contain the spread of avian 
influenza in poultry and to mitigate the 
global socioeconomic and security 
consequences of a potentially catastrophic 
human influenza pandemic 
Global AIDS 
Coordinator 
Secretary of state Interagency leadership and coordination 
body for the President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), designed to reduce the 
transmission and impact of HIV/AIDS 
through support for prevention, treatment, 
and care programs. 







Secretary of state Leads, coordinates, and institutionalizes U.S. 
government civilian capacity to help stabilize 
and reconstruct societies in transition from 
conflict or civil strife, including the creation or 
restoration of public health capabilities 
Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs 
State Department Reduce entry of illegal drugs into the United 
States; minimize impact of international crime 
on the United States and its citizens. Fund 
drug rehabilitation clinics 
Department of 
Agriculture 
Cabinet level Provide leadership on food, agriculture, 
natural resources, and related issues; animal 
health 
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Food and Drug 
Administration 
Cabinet level Protect the public health by assuring the 
safety, efficacy, and security of human and 
veterinary drugs, biological products, medical 
devices, the U.S. food supply, cosmetics, and 





Reduce global poverty through the 
promotion of sustainable economic growth 
International Affairs 
and Global Health 
Security Office 
Office of Health 
Affairs, Department of 
Homeland Security 
(DHS)  
Subject matter experts on all aspects of 
global health security, including avian and 
pandemic influenza, international medical 
readiness, and all-hazards emergency public 
health planning; leads and coordinates 
interagency biodefense activities 
Fogarty International 
Center 
National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) 
Form and support international partnerships 
for collaborative global health research and 
training programs 
Office of Global Health 
Affairs 
Department of Health 
and Human Services 
Develops U.S. policy and strategy positions 
related to health issues. Provides policy 
guidance and coordination on refugee health 
policy issues, in collaboration with the U.S. 
Public Health Service Operating Divisions, the 
Office of Refugee Resettlement in the 
Administration for Children and Families, the 
Department of State, and others. 
Office of Medicine, 
Science, and Public 
Health 




Department of Health 
and Human Services 
(HHS) 
Coordinate all international activities related 
to public health emergency preparedness and 
response and coordinate ASPR’s overall 
influenza pandemic efforts 




CDC Domestic preparedness activities, including 
management of the Select Agent Program 
and the Strategic National Stockpile 
Coordinating Office for 
Global Health 
CDC Global Disease Detection Program, Field 
Epidemiology Training Program, International 
Emerging Infections Program, and influenza 
activities related to surveillance and detection 
Biosurveillance 
Coordinating Unit 
CDC Oversees the National Biosurveillance 
Strategy. Outlined in Homeland Security 







Around-the-clock domestic biosurveillance 
Medical 
countermeasures 
National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, NIH 
Conduct and support research aimed at 
developing new and improved medical tools 
against potential bioterrorism agents 
 
 




ASPR Establish systems that encourage and 
facilitate the development and acquisition of 
medical countermeasures such as vaccines, 
therapeutics, and diagnostics, as well as 
innovative approaches to meet the threat of 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
(CBRN) agents and emerging infectious 
diseases, including pandemic influenza 
Project Bioshield HHS Project BioShield Act of 2004 (PL 108-276), 
to create a government market for research 
and development of CBRN medical 
countermeasures in which the commercial 
market would not otherwise invest  
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Appendix B. Department of Defense Programs That 
Have an Impact on Global Health 
 






Assistant secretary of 
defense for health 
affairs 
Force health 
protection; recruit and 
maintain a healthy 
force; prevent illness 
and injury in the 
force; provide clinical 







Naval Health Research 
Center 









programs; support the 
mission of the 
Presidents Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief 
$100 million 









delivery of disaster 










CDHAM Assist in the 
development of the 
health care system for 





and Civic Aid, 
www.dsca.osd.mil 
Assistant secretary of 




to assure allies and 
deter threats; respond 
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Ship Visits (Hospital 




Increase the security 






Medical civic action 
programs 
Military services 
Dental civic action 
programs 
Military services 
Veterinary civic action 
programs 
Military services 
Promote the specific 
operational readiness 
skills of armed forces 
personnel; advance 
security assistance of 




Joint exercises U.S. Joint Forces 
Command J-7 and 
Joint Staff J-7 
  







commanders in Iraq 
and Afghanistan to 




their areas of 
responsibility by 
carrying out programs 
that will immediately 




Air Force International 
Health Specialist 
Program 
Air Force Medical 
Service 
Identify Air Force 
medical personnel 
with specialized 
language or cultural 
skills and provides a 
database of medics 
with capabilities 
tailored for specific 
missions 
$600,000 















medical capabilities in 
disaster response and 
health care 
management through 














Assistant secretary of 
defense for health 
affairs 





natural disasters to 












and its interests from 




and high explosives) 
by reducing the threat 
and providing quality 






and assistant secretary 
of defense for global 
security affairs 
Build biodefense 
capacity of foreign 
scientists and 
governments to 

















technology for use by 
the military; radical 
innovations 
$3.2 billion 
U.S. Army Research 









agents to biosafety 
level 4l 
 
Armed Forces Research 
Institute of Medical 
Sciences 
U.S. Army–Thailand Conducts 
collaborative research 
on tropical diseases 
endemic to Thailand 
and Southeast Asia 
 
Navy medical research 
units 
U.S. Navy partnership 
with Indonesia and 
Egypt 
Field research on 
infectious diseases 
endemic to host 
countries 
 
Naval Medical Research 
Institute Detachment 
U.S. Navy partnership 
with Peru 
Field research in 
infectious diseases 
endemic to host 
country 
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Air Force Institute of 
Operational Health 
Promote global health 










and surveillance of, 
and response to, 
infectious disease 
threats to military 
personnel and 
families, readiness, 
and national security 
 








and databases on 
foreign military and 






risks, and militarily 









Note: Only a fraction of the FY2009 programmatic budget is directed toward global health activities. 
